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Abstract. 
 
This paper analyses data on the daily work decisions of archaeological workers on a 
Syrian archaeological dig in 1938. The remuneration contract that these workers faced 
involved a fixed component and a stochastic component termed “bakshish” which 
were daily payments for small finds that the worker made on the dig. The value of 
these finds we argue represent transitory movements in the worker’s wage which can 
be used to examine intertemporal labour supply behaviour. 
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I. Introduction. 
 
This paper analyses the daily labour supply or attendance decisions of workers 
employed on an archaeological dig in Northern Syria in 1938.  We argue that this 
particular labour market is an attractive one to study if the intertemporal labour supply 
hypothesis is of interest. The reason for this is that under the payment system we 
observe on the dig, for which we have data, the daily wage data had a stochastic 
element which consisted of payments (which were called bakshish2) for (small) finds 
that the worker makes on each day of the dig.  This element of the remuneration we 
argue constitutes a transitory wage shock, and if we also have data on labour supply 
responses, which we do, then an examination of intertemporal labour supply is 
possible.  
  
We will focus on the labour supply of these workers at the extensive margin, 
that is whether they chose to participate on a given day.  In this sense our paper is 
similar to studies of the labour supply of food vendors at baseball games by Oettinger 
(1999). We have no direct data on worker effort 3 during this dig but we do not 
believe it to be so relevant to our analysis.  What we have in mind is that the 
archaeological workers are faced with a routine task of digging in a systematic and 
careful fashion for items.  He has no particular reason to think that digging extra fast 
will involve more finds - and hence higher wages – since he has no idea whether he 
will find some objects or not.  In this situation he will work at a steady pace and take 
whatever comes along.  Anecdotal evidence supports the view that archaeological 
workers are actually encouraged to work in this way, because if they work ‘too fast’ 
they may miss some small object4 or break some small artefact.  From the standpoint 
of our economic model this is a very convenient feature of the situation as it means 
that the worker is not making decisions on any effort margin, he is simply deciding 
whether to supply his labour on a given day conditional on their past bakshish 
payments.   
 
                                                 
2 Sometime spelt baksheesh or bakshisk 
3 The interested reader should consult Treble (2003) for a discussion where effort is more important. 
4 Indeed we report a quote later in the paper which suggests that there may well have been a real cost to 
working “too” fast as a broken find would attract less bakshish 
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The study is facilitated by the careful record keeping of the archaeologist Max 
Mallowan (MM) and the fortunate survival of his pay book recording daily wage 
payments to his site workers in his excavation of the archaeological site at Tell Brak 
in Syria in 1938.  Over a period of nearly two months during this dig in that year MM 
kept incredibly detailed handwritten records, of the daily labour supplied by each 
worker (by name) and the resulting wage payments made to them. Max Mallowan 
would tour the site towards the end of the working day, he would agree an amount for 
all the finds that an individual worker had made. The agreed amount would be 
recorded in his wage book and Max would take possession of the material. As we will 
argue later on this system gave incentives for careful and vigilant work5. A small 
section of this pay book has been scanned and appears in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Section of Max Mallowan’s Wage Book from Tell Brak 1938. 
 
 
So, for example, reading along the first line this worker, Sirkis Tanelian, 
received a total payment of 353 quresh (the local currency at this time) for his 
“week’s” work over 8.5 days, (the half day was for settling up) 55 quresh in bakshish 
and 298 quresh basic pay (35 quresh a day plus 18 quresh for the half day). Also the 
pay book records the days worked by each worker – for example the fourth line down 
shows that Ahmad Othman did not work on Saturday but returned Sunday this 
                                                 
5 The bakshish system seems therefore not to have suffered from the perverse incentives implicit in 
some payment systems employed by other delvers into past. It is reported, Swisher, Garniss and Lewin 
(2000) that Ralph von Koenigswald searching for the “missing link” in Java had offered to pay a fixed 
amount (10 cents) per piece of hominid bone, only to find their workers when they excavated a bone 
would then proceed to break it into as many pieces as practicable so as to maximise income.  
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“week”. We find that there is hardly any ambiguity in these records; the reason for 
this is that MM used this book for settling up at the end of each “week” and he wanted 
to ensure that there were no time consuming disputes during this half day. 
 
II.  Background Information on the Tell Brak dig in 1938 and the Labour 
Market for Archaeological Workers. 
 
MM was from the traditional school of archaeology. He was trained by the 
eminent archaeologist Lord Leonard Woolley who was the Keeper of the Ashmolean 
Museum in Oxford.  ‘he dug systematically to ensure comparison with finds at 
complementary sites both geographically and chronologically.’  McCall (2001b), p53.   
 
 We are fortunate to have lots of details on how the market for archaeological 
workers operated and specifically what the situation was in the Tell Brak dig in 1938 
from the accounts of Agatha Christie6 (who was Mallowan’s wife) and the memoirs 
of Max Mallowan himself.  The latter describes the nature of how the market worked 
as follows7: 
 
During the excavations we employed 200-250 men, sometimes less, sometimes more.  
They worked from sunrise to sunset with an interval of half and hour for breakfast 
and an hour for luncheon.  It was a strenuous day’s work for which they were paid at 
the rate of one rupee8, the equivalent of about eighteen pence.  In addition, bakshisk, 
that is tips, were awarded for all small finds as an encouragement to them to keep 
their eyes open.  The gangs consisted of a pickman, a spademan and four, five or six 
basketmen according to the distance which the soil had to be carried.   
 
The pattern of aggregate bakshish payments at Tell Brak in 1938 is reported in 
Figure 2.  One might expect that the value of finds may be relatively modest at the 
start of a dig until a specific depth was reached. However the level of payments here 
seem to have been relatively constant for the first three-quarters of the dig. There is 
evidence that MM was adjusting the prices (upwards) for finds in the very early days 
of the dig, we interpret this as him trying to set prices at the point at which workers 
would chose to sell the find to him rather than try and smuggle finds off site, which 
                                                 
6 See Christie Mallowan  (1946) 
7 Mallowan (1977), p.43. 
8 Not actually rupees – just a convenient expression for foreign currency. 
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would run the risk of sacking. Later on such adjustments were very rarely observed, 
we presume that he judged he had found the correct level. 
                              Figure 2: Aggregate Bakshish Payments at Tell Brak 
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The pattern of daily labour supply over the course of the dig is graphed in 
Figure 3 in terms of the number of workers who work on any given day in the dig.  
The five ‘weeks’ of the dig are clearly distinguishable as there is a clear cycle to each 
week.                                           
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 Within each week labour supply starts off low (or absence is high) at the 
beginning of the week and builds slowly during the week until attendance is highest 
on the last day of each week.  Over the life time of the dig, from week I to week V  
the net number of workers employed slowly falls as the work involved in the dig 
slowly exhausts itself. In wage book itself there were a small number of workers 
employed for a prior week (which was in fact in 1937, almost a year before the main 
dig in which it appears the site was marked out ready for the main work).  
 
We argue that the demand for labour (per day) by MM is fixed and constant 
and the labour supply decision is an individual one. Naturally, in reality, there is some 
degree of unobserved heterogeneity involved in the nature of supply and demand. On 
the demand side it may be the case that: unexpectedly large finds require extra 
workers, dangerous digging conditions necessitate extra workers to solve a problem at 
short notice, the unforeseen absence or sickness of some workers dictates that 
additional workers are required at short notice, agricultural crop harvests mean 
workers return to their villages, or weather conditions change in an unforeseen way 
and this delays or prevents work and this has knock on effects.  On the supply side the 
individual may be unable or unwilling to supply their labour on a given day or “week” 
(we return to this later) for a variety of reasons associated with family or village 
obligations and other personal factors. However MM doesn’t seem to have imposed 
any extra penalties on workers who absent themselves and then return.  In reality 
though the supply of workers was largely fixed at the beginning of the dig and then it 
was a question of trying to retain their services as time passed.  Agatha describes the 
process of initial recruitment9: 
 
‘Once the work has been started on by the strangers from Jerablus, workmen from the 
spot hasten to be enrolled.  The men of the Sheikh’s village have already begun to 
work.  Now men from neighbouring villages began to arrive by ones and twos.  There 
are Kurds from over the Turkish border, some Armenians, and a few Yezidis …’ 
 
Once hired the men work in gangs.  Agatha also describes how the gangs 
work10: 
                                                 
9 Christie Mallowan (1946) , p.84. 
10 Christie Mallowan (1946) , p.85. 
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 The system is a simple one.  The men are organized into gangs.  Men with any 
previous experience of digging, and men who seem intelligent and quick to learn, are 
chosen as pickmen.  Men, boys and children are paid the same wage.  Over and above 
that there is bakshish.  That is to say, a small cash payment on each object found. 
The pickman of each gang has the best chance of finding objects.  When his square of 
ground has been traced out by him, he starts upon it with a pick.  After him comes the 
spademan.  With his spade he shovels the earth into baskets, which three or four 
‘basket-boys’ then carry away to a spot appointed as dump.  As they turn the earth 
out, they sort through it for any likely object missed ….. not infrequently some small 
amulet or bead gives them a good reward. 
 
What is the financial nature of an archaeological expedition ?  MM would 
typically ‘cobble together’ funds for his expeditions from a number of sources.  The 
precise sources of funds are not detailed for the expedition to Brak are not recorded.  
However the account in McCall (2001a) may be typical of how an expedition was 
funded. ‘He spoke to the Director of the British Museum, … who consulted with his 
Trustees.  They were happy to sponsor him, but only in a small way.  He had more 
luck with Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, the Chairman of the British School of 
Archaeology in Iraq, which put up £600.  ….The Percy Sladen Memorial Fund made 
a grant of £400 towards the funds required for excavating Tell Arpachiyah. ‘ McCall 
(2001), p.84.  The total funds now then stood £1100 and MM thought it would be 
‘less difficult to find the remainder’.  MM then wrote a brochure describing the nature 
of his proposed expedition and its importance to prospective backers.  It brought in 
the rest of the funding. We are also told that Agatha was often a backer for MM. 
Agatha ‘…also supported the excavations as an anonymous sponsor….. Sometimes 
she donated the rights of a detective story to the excavations’.  p.13, Trümpler (2001c) 
 
This illustrates that the funding for expeditions was hard to come by, usually 
put together from a variety of sources, planned well before hand within a strict budget 
often scrutinized long before the expedition took place, and subject to a specific 
overall budget constraint. 
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III.  The System of Bakshish Payments. 
 
The characteristics of the bakshish payments are that they were payments 
based on finds made each day.  On every consecutive day the finds were recorded in 
the pay book and each man would then receive his supplementary bakshish pay along 
with his regular pay at the end of the week.  This is clearly described in several 
passages: 
 
‘The bakshish payable to each man was recorded in a little book held by Michel, and 
at the end of each week the man’s wages plus his accumulated tips were paid over .  
For example a cylinder seal – he made sure the finder was properly rewarded.  On 
the other hand, he occasionally awarded small sums for worthless items as a means of 
encouragement’.  p.109 , McCall (2001a) 
 
Although we cannot distinguish from the data which individual in each gang was: the 
pickman, the spademan and the basket boys – it was the case that the basket boys 
earned the same daily rate as the others and could easily earn the same (or more) 
bakshish due to the small (but valuable nature) of some of the finds. 
 
‘To encourage the workman to keep a sharp eye open and dig with great care, Max 
paid bakshish for every good find. They were intrigued by the difficulty of predicting 
how he would assess an object. The little boys whose job it was to look through the 
contents of the baskets of soil a second time in search of finds could earn as much 
money in this way as a grown spademan or a pickman. Every afternoon, just before 
work ended, the workmen lined up to show Max any special finds. If these items found 
favour with him, he would write down the sum earned beside each name in a book, 
and when pay-day came the bakshish was paid out along with the regular working 
wage. Every worker remembered exactly what he was owed and would put the record 
straight if he was paid too little or even too much.’ ’  p.188-9, Trümpler (2001b) 
 
There seems to have been little scope for cheating this bakshish system either 
by digging where one was not assigned to or by trying to sell finds outside. Digging 
outside limits was monitored:  
  
‘The dig in Tell Brak was extremely successful, producing a quantity of objects of 
very high quality. In the last season of digging, during the autumn of 1938, however, 
there was a serious incident that clearly illustrates the potential dangers of such 
excavations and at the same time gives a glimpse of the mentality of the local people. 
 Many finds of beautiful animal amulets in stone or ivory had earned the 
workers plenty of bakshish. Since bakshish represented good additional earnings, the 
idea of the money undoubtedly induced some of the men to try their hand at forgery 
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now and then. On the dig in Tell Brak, however, the animal amulets led to something 
much worse. They were found at a certain depth in a shaft that was supposed to be cut 
straight down from the top. However to get at the area containing the amulets as 
quickly as possible the men started undercutting at the bottom of the shaft, without 
permission and indeed against Max’s express orders. During a midday break some of 
them crept into the shaft from the far side of the mound. And went on with the 
undercutting, planning to say that the figures were finds from their own part of the 
site and earn bakshish for them. But the overhang broke away, burying five men, and 
only one of them was brought out alive. After the matter had been settled with the 
sheikh and the French security officer, Max posted a guard at the scene of the 
accident, fearing further illicit digging. He himself waited out of sight during the next 
day's midday break, and caught three more workmen in the act of coming to dig at the 
same spot. The rest of the men showed little respect for the dead, making fun of them 
in song and gestures. The members of the archaeological team had already noted on 
other occasions that death counted for very little in these countries.’  p.202-3, 
Trümpler (2001b) 
 
We also know from sources that there was a fair degree of monitoring of what 
the workers were doing.  Agatha herself spent a lot of time observing and 
photographing the workers and acted a little like a spy – reporting workers who were 
hiding or asleep.  Hence we do not think it would have been easy for any worker to 
smuggle out of the site any find to try and sell it on the black market. However in 
fixing the level of bakshish for an item MM would have explicitly kept the black 
market value of the object in mind.  We know that other archaeologists used the 
system and recognised this feature – notably Sir Leonard Woolley11
 
‘Payment of baksheesh is the best procedure for preventing carelessness and theft, 
according to Woolley.  Some excavators still refuse to adopt this procedure, although 
by all experience bears out its wisdom….. Woolley notes each find and values it at the 
price a black market dealer might pay for the stolen object.  On an average season 
the baksheesh bill may amount to 15 per cent of the wages.  The gain to science is 
altogether out of proportion to the sum.  In the first place there is no purloining of the 
finds, which would then be lost to science.  In the second place the system trains the 
workmen to exercise extreme care during excavation, for baksheeh is paid only for 
objects which are not broken or damaged by clumsiness during exhumation.  ‘The 
system say Woolley ‘does create an astonishing amount of good will’. 
 
Sir Mortimer Wheeler makes similar observations in Wheeler (1956). Clearly 
paying the workers a reasonable value for their finds was rational.  Agatha is even 
more explicit in terms of how objects may be valued12: 
                                                 
11 Ceram (1963), p.257. 
12 Christie (1936), p.44. 
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‘You have to pay the workmen who find it the weight of the object in gold.’ 
‘Good gracious!’ I exclaimed. But why?’ 
‘Oh it’s a custom.  For one thing, it prevents them from stealing.  You see, if they did 
steal, it wouldn’t be for the archaeological value but for the intrinsic value.  They 
could melt it down.  So we make it easy for them to be honest’. 
 
 Clearly then it would seem that the Bakshish payments are a rather ingenious 
way of trying to encourage the right incentives in the workers to be observant, but 
work carefully and honestly declare their finds at the end of each day.  Without this 
system the output of the workers in terms of the quantity and quality (completeness) 
of the finds would be significantly impaired.  
 
 There are two other features of the bakshish system which turn out to be very 
convenient for our purposes.  Firstly the nature of the finds is not related to worker 
effort and secondly there is a large element of randomness in when and how the finds 
are made.  Two further quotes illustrate these ideas, firstly on the randomness of 
finding artefacts13: 
 
There is no doubt that to the workmen, gamblers all by nature, the uncertainty of the 
business is its principal attraction.  And it is astonishing how a run of luck will attend 
certain gangs.  Sometimes when new ground is being broken Max will say: ‘I shall put 
Ibraham and his gang on this outer wall; they’ve found far too much lately.  Now 
poor old Rainy George has had no luck lately.  I’ll put him on to a good place’. 
But lo and behold! In Ibraham’s patch, the houses of the poorest quarter of the old 
city, straightaway is found a cache of an earthenware pot containing a heap of gold 
earrings .. and up goes Ibrahim’s baksish; and Rainy George digging in a promising 
cemetery area where finds should abound, gets unaccountably sparse burials. 
 
And secondly on the observation that the work was not productively related to 
effort14: 
 
‘It is true that they work in what may be called leisurely fashion, with only occasional 
spurts of frenzied digging or running when a wave of gaiety sweeps over them, but it 
is all really hard manual labour’. 
 
What these observations suggests is that the worker cannot strategically decide 
to put in extra effort to try to alter their wage.  The logic is that the archaeological 
worker is faced with a routine task, digging monotonously and carefully for items all 
                                                 
13 Christie Mallowan (1946) , p.96. 
14 Christie Mallowan (1946) , p.153. 
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day long.  He has no particular reason to think that digging extra fast with involve 
more finds - and hence higher wages – since he has no idea whether he will find some 
objects or not – and indeed digging faster may result in missing some small object or 
breaking an object which would mean less bakshish. As we have noted from the 
standpoint of our economic model this is a very convenient feature of our modelling 
as it means that the worker is not making any decision other than whether to supply 
his labour on a given day – conditional on their past bakshish payments (and the 
relative size of expected future bakshish payments).  
 
IV  The Literature on Intertemporal Labour Supply. 
   
In broad terms the intertemporal labour supply hypothesis predicts that 
workers will respond to upward shifts in their wage by increasing their labour supply 
if this response can be seen solely as a substitution effect. This can be achieved if the 
wage change is sufficiently well anticipated that the worker builds the change into his 
or her permanent income, so the wage change, when it is observed, does not entail any 
(permanent) income shift. This can also be achieved when the wage shift is purely 
transitory, in which case there will be a negligible effect on income. 
 
The literature on the intertemporal labour supply elasticity as it stands doesn’t 
give a clear message on the estimated value of inter-temporal elasticity.  Early 
estimates of life cycle models which used panel data – for example Altonji (1986) - 
suggested that this elasticity is really very small.  However many early studies in this 
literature used annual changes in hours worked in response to annual wage changes, 
and as has been suggested by some researchers in the area that it seems doubtful that 
the measured annual wage changes is fully anticipated. 
 
 Some subsequent studies have tried to exploit specific aspects of certain 
labour markets to identify these intertemporal effects, and this study is clearly in this 
vein. Camerer et al (1997) studied the daily labour supply decisions of New York City 
cab drivers.  They argued that the demand for taxi services is subject to large 
transitory shocks due to the weather.  They use this ‘exogenous’ shift in demand to 
estimate a negatively significant wage elasticity.  In other words they claimed that cab 
drivers have very short time horizons and will be more like to quit work when they 
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receive a sudden, unanticipated increase in daily income.  Farber (2005)  however 
conjectures that this counterintuitive result could be due to problems with 
instrumenting the cab drivers wage, Farber also raises questions regarding the 
appropriate empirical methodology for such situations. 
 
Oettinger (1999) also analyzes the daily labour supply behaviour of food and 
beverage vendors at a single stadium over an entire baseball season.  Quite rightly 
Oettinger suggests that the wage data he observes will be endogenously determined.  
He uses observable shifts in product demand (as measured by attendance at the game 
and other characteristics of the match) to instrument for the vendor wage.  He finds 
positive elasticity estimates of between .55 and .65.  Hence he suggests that a stadium 
vendor is much more likely to supply his labour at the next game if he or she 
anticipates a higher wage.  Oettinger argues that wage determination in these 
situations is clearly endogenous (this is his main criticism of the Camerer paper) as 
both demand conditions and vendor labour supply decisions will determine the 
observed wage. Oettinger takes account of this in his estimation by instrumenting the 
demand by crowd size. Although the conclusions of this paper are credible it 
potentially suffers from two logical drawbacks.  Firstly, the games are not on 
consecutive days and hence the labour supply decision is being played out over a 
whole season but only on isolated match days – this means that the connection 
between the last match shock to earnings and the decision to supply labour at the next 
match could be separately by some considerable delay.  Second the wage 
determination in this model is clearly endogenous – and although the author takes 
great pains to try to circumvent this we would still wish to know if the result on the 
elasticity estimate is sensitive to this IV modelling technique. 
 
   A further point about the literature is that there is an important difference in 
the time periods over which the labour supply decisions are made. In the case of 
Oettinger (1999) the decision relates to supplying a days labour at intervals of up to 2-
3 weeks apart, in the case of Altonji inferences are being made about intertemporal 
labour supply by looking at consecutive years decisions.  We suggest that none of 
these time intervals is ideal and the results of estimation could be sensitive to the time 
interval in the data. 
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The model of intertemporal labour supply could ideally be best tested in a 
situation in which individuals receive truly random transitory shocks to their earnings 
in a given time period and then observe their labour supply decisions in a sequence of 
contiguous time periods thereafter with all other supply and demand decisions held 
constant.  If the shock is purely transitory and relatively small then there will be no 
significant income effect, this is essentially the aspect of the market for cab rides that 
Camerer et al were trying to exploit. We would also like to observe such data over a 
considerable time for a large enough group of workers to facilitate practical 
estimation.  Finally we would like to be able to find data in which the actions of the 
agent supplying the labour are independent of the market forces of labour supply and 
demand.  We think we have found such data in our sample of archaeological workers 
since our bakshish payments are random components which depend on finds on a 
daily basis and they do not impact on the daily base wage.  Hence we do not need to 
seek the ‘demand shifter variables’ that Oettinger (1999) advocates are necessary for 
identification. This is not to say that we don’t need to take account of the participation 
decision that workers will make in choosing whether to present themselves at the site 
for a “weeks” work; we will return to this later. 
 
 The bakshish payments follow a particular stochastic structure. An initial 
“good” find (above the average in terms of value) is unanticipated, thereafter the 
expected value of subsequent finds follows and autocorrelated structure the nature of 
which is well understood by the workers (by their own observation). So the worker 
anticipates a higher expected value of his finds at day t+1 if he had a higher than 
average find at day t. 
  
In what we do we will in fact use only the bakshish payments for our analysis 
and ignore the base wage which is completely determined by the daily rate.  In 
addition we will find it more convenient to model the absence decision rather than the 
labour supply decision since we have no variation in hours worked within the day as 
all workers either worked the whole day or not at all.  
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V An Economic Model of Labour Supply (and Absence) for Archaeological 
workers. 
 
We argue that these Bakshish payments represent transitory and unanticipated 
wage shocks to workers at an individual level and as such should induce a positive 
labour supply response in a future period provided the substitution effect of the extra 
payment outweighs any possible income effect of the additional payment. This is in 
line with conventional wisdom (see Altonji (1988), Camerer et al (1997), Oettinger 
(1999) amongst others.  
 
In this section we simplify the analysis to it’s essentials.  We will assume that 
the representative worker has a utility function defined over (daily) earnings, x, and 
(daily) non-work time, l. 
 
1 2t t t tU x lβ β ε= + +
W
t
      (1) 
 
On each day the worker has the choice between attending work or absenting 
himself. Each of these actions will have a utility payoff, 
 
2
1 2 ( )
A A
t t
W
t t
U T
U x T h
β ε
β β ε
= +
= + − +        (2)  
 
where 1 2, 0β β >  and T is the stock of time, h contracted hours and xt earnings. The 
central element of the situation we are analysing is the stochastic structure of these 
earnings. We will examine this first. We know that daily earnings were made up of 
two components:  
 
        (3) t Bx x k= + t
 
where Bx  is base pay and is the worker’s realised bakshish payment at time t. We 
assume that this quantity is determined in the following way. 
tk
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 1 1
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1:
1: ( ) (1 )t t t t
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t k k v k tv
α
α ρ α α ρ ρ− −
= = +
> = + − + = − + +    (4)  
 
Where α  is a constant, 0 < ρ < 1 is the simple autocorrelation persistence effect of 
bakshish in consecutive time periods (capturing the idea that if a worker’s bakshish at 
t-1 is higher than average his expected bakshish at t is higher) and ν is a random 
white noise component.  The constant α  is the unconditional expectation of bakshish 
( )tE k tα= ∀ , however, the conditional expectation is 
 
 1( | ) (1 ) 2t t tE k k k t1α ρ ρ− −= − + ≥     (5) 
 
The stochastic aspect of the bakshish payments makes the utility of work 
stochastic. The probability of observing the worker absent at time t can therefore be 
written as  
 
 
2 1 2
2 1 1 2
2 1 1 2
2 1 1
1 1
( )
( ( ) ( ) )
( ( ( | )) ( )
( ( (1 ) ) ( )
( ( (1 ) ) )
( * )
A W
t t t
A W
t t t
A W
t B t k t
A W
t B t
W A
B t t t
W A
t t t
P P U U
P T E x T h
P T x E k k T h
P T x k T h
P h x k
P k
β ε β β ε
β ε β β ε )
)tβ ε β α ρ ρ β ε
β β α ρ ρ ε ε
α β ρ ε ε
−
−
−
−
= >
= + > + − +
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where 2 1* ( (1Bh x ))α β β α ρ= − + − and since 1, 0β ρ > the implication is that probability 
of absence will be negatively related to past bakshish, and this variable should be 
included in our empirical estimation of the probability.  
 
VI  Empirical Analysis. 
 
Before the empirical analysis can begin we need to carefully describe the nature of 
the data.  We have detailed records on a daily basis for each worker, on a named 
basis, relating to their bakshish payments.  The recorded data is organised in gangs so 
we know which workers are in each gang.  There were to 42 gangs working in week I, 
but only 20 by week V. The typical size of a gang was 9 workers but in the last week 
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one gang was only 3 workers.  The largest gang was 10 workers.  The composition of 
the gangs changed quite considerably over the course of the dig. We can partially 
infer from the names the ethnic origin of the workers and their gender15, it was 
generally believed that the workforce on these digs was entirely male, however we 
find a small proportion that have female names. These we think are not women, but 
younger girls employed to sift through the rubble. The predominant ethnic group was 
Arab, around 80%, some Turks, just short of 10%, and also some Kurds, Persians, and 
a remainder whose ethnic group was unclear. Gender or Ethnic origin don’t really 
have any significant effect on either absence within week or participation, the only 
significant effect found is being of Arab descent. 
 
When a worker is absent this was carefully recorded.  When a worker was 
sacked this was also recorded. Sacking did not seem to be a permanent state as some 
workers returned to work on a later date.  One conceptual problem we have is 
distinguishing between different types of labour supply and absence.  Some workers 
are absent for the odd day or two within the week.  Others do not supply their labour 
for a whole week or more.  Clearly there are different patterns of labour supply 
choices being exhibited here. Those workers who quit for a week or more may well be 
returning to more distant villages to tend to family or agricultural duties.  Those who 
are absent for a day or two within a given week are more likely to be ill, not inclined 
to work that day, or be those workers whose home is not so far distant and may be 
able to return to it by absenting themselves for only a day. 
 
There is also limited evidence in the pay book that there may be family type 
decisions taking place as often workers with the same family name but a different 
Christian name will appear in the same gang.  Then in different weeks these 
individuals with the same surnames may absent themselves.  It is possible that there is 
some kind of family labour supply decision with brothers of fathers and sons sharing 
the archaeological dig work that is available with meeting family and other 
agricultural commitments16. 
 
                                                 
15 We are particularly indebted to Makram Larguem for help in this regard 
16 On more than one occasion there is a note in the pay book of a person returning home to their village 
to plough. 
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Workers work for a period ‘weeks’ beginning on a specific day and working 
for up to eight with half a day added for administering the pay.  Hence the week is not 
a conventional week.  Then there were two or three rest days and following that the 
next ‘week’ would start.  The structure of the weeks was as follows: 
 
Table 1: Chronology of dig at Tell Brak 1938 
Week 
Number 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
# of 
Days
Start 
Day 
End 
Day
Number 
of 
Gangs 
Number 
of 
Workers 
Days off  at the 
end of the week 
I  28/3/38 4/4/38 8 1 8 42 342 Tue, Wed 
II 7/4/38 14/4/38 8 9 16 37 290 Fri, Sat 
III 17/4/38 24/4/38 8 17 24 31 258 Mon, Tue, Wed 
IV 28/4/38 3/5/38 7 25 31 29 242 Thurs, Fri  
V 7/5/38 14/5/38 8 32 39 20 166  
 
We are still not certain about exactly how the week was structured.  The day 
off was reported to be Tuesday but this is not confirmed by the pay book.  
 
‘Although it was not easy to control so many different nationalities, speaking several 
different languages, Max succeeded in organizing the dig without any major 
incidents. His diplomacy was required, for instance, to settle the delicate matter of  
the day of rest. The Muslims, who outnumbered the Christians, wanted it to be Friday. 
The Armenians on the other hand, refused to work on Sunday. Finally Max decided to 
make Tuesday the day of rest, since no practicing religion had its feast-day on 
Tuesday.’ p.188, Trümpler (2001b) 
 
It is clear from the pay book that there is a degree of turnover with workers 
coming and going quite a lot.  Also the composition of the gangs changed – although 
for the most part there was at least one or two names which remained the same 
throughout most of the weeks.  It is conceivable that this person was a gang leader or 
foreman of some kind but this is not verifiable so we do not attempt to condition for 
this in our analysis. 
 
Table 2 presents the basic summary statistics which show that average daily 
bakshish of nearly 8 quresh was around 22% of the average daily fixed wage (which 
 17
was 35 quresh).  The table also shows us that the absence rate on any given day was 
fairly low at a little under 3%. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Data (NT = 8159) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min  Max 
Absence  0.0292        0.1683   0 1 
Daily Bakshish (quresh) 8.0559       10.9795       -5    250 
 
The negative daily minimum in the previous table was a fine, however there 
were very few of these. Figure 4 graphs the daily absence rate at the dig over the 39 
days of the dig.  Again we can clearly see the cycle of the week’s activities as absence 
is higher at the beginning of each week and very low at the end of the week when pay 
day comes. 
Figure 4: Daily Absence Rate at the Tell Brak dig 
 
A simple investigation of the relationship between Bakshish payments over 
successive time periods reported in Tables 3 show that there is autocorrelation of 
these payments over time.  The first order autocorrelation coefficient estimate varies 
Mean  
absence 
rate 
day
2 39 
.011719 
.208696 
Week I Week II Week III Week IV Week V
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from 0.37 to 0.23 depending on whether specific days are controlled for (Specification 
II) or whether fixed effects (for the days) is modelled explicitly (Specification III).  
As one might expect the payment of Bakshish on any one day is statistically 
associated with payments of the previous day even if the order of the day in the cycle 
of the dig is controlled for.  We might expect this to be the case if a worker begins 
unearthing a collection of related objects within a small location he will go on 
working on this area in successive days. 
 
Table 3:  Estimation of  1t tk k tα ρ − ε= + +    (NT = 8159) 
Variable Specification I 
Coefficient  (SE)  
Specification II 
Coefficient (SE) 
Specification III FE 
Coefficient (SE)  
Const 5.1155 (0.1605)   0.9994 (0.2401) 6.2672 (0.1532) 
Bakshish (k)t-1 0.3730 (0.0118)    0.2917 (0.0120) 0.2300 (0.0119)  
Day    0.2718 (0.0121)  
 
It is clear from Figure 3 in particular, that there is significant variation in the 
pattern of participation over the 5 “weeks”. Two facts seem of particular relevance. In 
the first week we observe almost 400 workers on the site, by the fifth week this has 
diminished to less than 200. Also if we observe that over the whole 5 “week” period 
we observe 823 unique names entered in the wage book.  Table 4 provides a 
breakdown of the participation patterns observed.  
 
Here we see that a large proportion (67%) of workers work only for one week 
and a further 16% work only for two weeks.  Of those who work for two weeks or 
more a large fraction work for two consecutive weeks.  This suggests that the problem 
of travelling to and from the site to remote villages is an important factor in decisions 
to participate in any given week.   Our modelling of absence is explicitly on specific 
day(s) with the ‘week’.  In the econometric estimation in the next section we first 
model absence alone and then we model daily absence jointly with weekly 
participation.  We do this in order to examine the possible endogeneity  of the two 
decisions (absence and participation) and also to see whether our estimates of the 
intertemporal labour supply elasticity is robust to such considerations. 
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                              Table 4:  Participation patterns at the Tell Brak dig. 
Pattern  Week 1 Week 2  Week 3 Week 4  Week 5 Total 
1 1 0 0 0 0 184 
2 0 1 0 0 0 94 
3 0 0 1 0 0 91 
4 0 0 0 1 0 104 
5 
O
ne
 w
ee
k 
0 0 0 0 1 83 
6 1 1 0 0 0 50 
7 0 1 1 0 0 17 
8 0 0 1 1 0 21 
9 0        0 0 1 1 12 
10 1 0 1 0 0 7 
11 1 0 0 1 1 11 
12 1 0 0 0 1 1 
13 0 1 0 0 1 1 
14 0 0 1 1 1 4 
15 
Tw
o 
w
ee
ks
 
0 1 0 1 0 6 
16 0 0 1 1 1 7 
17 1 0 0 1 1 1 
18 1 1 0 0 1 2 
19 1 1 1 0 0 30 
20 0 1 0 1 1 4 
21 0 1 1 0 1 7 
22 0 1 1 1 0 15 
23 1 0 1 1 0 7 
24 1 1 0 1 0 7 
25 
Th
re
e 
W
ee
ks
 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
26 0 1 1 1 1 7 
27 1 0 1 1 1 2 
28 1 1 0 1 1 6 
29 1 1 1 0 1 4 
30 F
ou
r W
ee
ks
 
1 1 1 1 0 13 
31  1 1 1 1 1 24 
Total  350 288 257 261 177 823 
 
 
VII.  Econometric Estimation. 
 
To empirically implement eqn (6) we use data on the realisation of worker 
attendance, define the event  
 
1 worker i attends work on day t | participates in week k
( | 1)
0 worker i doesn't attend on day t| participates in week k it ik
d w ⎧= = ⎨⎩          (7) 
 
and noting the equivalence between the following two events 
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 ( 1| 1) ( A Wit ik t td w U U= = ≡ > )
)
                         (8) 
 
The appropriate econometric structure we argue is a discrete panel data model 
Heckman (1981).  This has been used in the analysis of absence patterns before, see 
Barmby, Orme and Treble (1992,1995). The probability of the event in (8) is building 
on section IV is 
 
1( 1| 1) ( * 0 | 1it k it it ikP d w P k v wα β −= = = + + > =        (9) 
 
where A Wit t tv ε ε= −  if the individual ,jt j A Wε = are independent extreme value type I 
random variables then  will have a Logistic CDF, which we denote F. Following 
Heckman we augment the specification of our probability to incorporate structural 
dependence by adding lagged absence as a regressor (this will pick up the effect of 
sickness). Thus we model the probability of the event of a worker not attending on a 
given day given that he attends as 
itv
 
1 1( 1| 1) ( * | 1it ik it it ikP d w F k d w )α β γ− −= = = + + =        (10) 
 
the likelihood contribution again given that he attends would be 
 
1 1
1 1 1
[ ln ( * ' | 1)
( *, , )
(1 ) ln(1 ( * ' | 1))]
WT
it it it ik
ik
t it it it ik
d F k d w
L
d F k d w
α β γα β γ α β γ
− −
= − −
+ + == + − − + + =∑      (11) 
 
Tw    being the number of days worked that ‘week’. The full likelihood is 
1 1
ln( , ) ln( ( 1)) (1 ) ln ( 0)
N NW
ik ik ik ik ik
i k
w L P w w P wβ γ
= =
= = + −∑∑ =     (12) 
 
where NW is number of weeks. We observe bakshish payments for workers on 
days that they work and enter the lag value in the regression component of the 
probability. Clearly we don’t observe bakshish payments when the worker doesn’t 
work, so there is a problem of what value to use when specifying the probability of 
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absence when the worker was absent the previous day, in the estimates reported here 
we simply take the last observed bakshish payment. 
Table 5  sets out the main result on the absence decision of the worker.  We 
estimate the model described above relating to the probability of each worker working 
on each specific day, (in this estimation we are essentially assuming  ie 
weighting the likelihood contributions equally) in equation (12) we return to 
modelling participation simultaneously shortly. In total our model is estimated for 823 
workers over a total of 8159 working days.  Our main estimation uses a Logistic 
model  this indicates that there is a negatively significant effect of lagged Bakshish 
payments on the probability of absence the next day.We also attempt to control for 
both the weekly effects we graphed in Figures 3 and 4 and the natural cycle of the dig.  
Hence we use dummies to control for:  each week of the dig and the last day of the 
week.  We also experimented with other similar specifications but the qualitative 
conclusions were very similar. We also experimented with allowing for unobserved 
effects in a Fixed Effects framework and found that the results were not qualitatively 
different, These results are reported in Appendix 1. 
( 1) 1ikP W = =
 
Table 5: Logistic Models for Daily Probability of Absence. * indicates significant 
at 5% level (N = 823, NT = 8159) 
 
Variable Coefficient (SE)  
Constant -3.8002*  (0.2418) 
Lag Absence 5.7251*  (0.2149) 
Lag Bakshish -0.0409*  (0.0169) 
Arab -0.4957* (0.2101) 
Week Dummies Yes 
End of Week Dummies Yes 
LnL  -586.1014 
 
 
Hence the results clearly indicate a negative effect of the value of the lag 
bakshish payment on the probability of absence.  
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 We now consider the model in which the absence and participation decisions 
are modelled jointly. We also model the probability of participating in a given week 
as 
 
1 2 3
1( 1)
1 exp( )ik
P W
week Arabθ θ θ= = + − − −                                     (13) 
 
The actual participation proportions over the 5 weeks can be observed from 
Table 4 as 350/823 = 0.43, 288/823 = 0.35, 0.31, 0.32, 0.22. The estimates below 
indicate predicted participation propensities of 0.4257, 0.3684, 0.3147, 0.2654, and 
0.2215 respectively. Referring back to the likelihood in equation (12), this structure 
can be interpreted as weighting the components by the probability of participation; 
in the estimation in Table 6 we weight the absence history of, say, pattern 25 from 
Table 4 by the (estimated) probability observing that particular participation pattern.  
ikL
 
 There are two ways of interpreting these participation probabilities. Firstly 
they represent a decision of the worker, for instance outside opportunities, unobserved 
to us, such as tending of crops etc, are causing workers to be less likely to return to 
the site as weeks progress. A second interpretation would be that this reflects 
Mallowan’s demand preferences, so a positive coefficient on Arab would indicate he 
is less likely to lay off Arab workers. We should emphasise that we have found no 
evidence in the descriptions of the way Mallowan organised his digs to suggest that he 
laid off workers in any systematic way, but since modelling demand influences has 
been an important part of this particular labour supply literature, it is important that 
our empirical approach can accommodate this. 
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Table 6: Simultaneous Estimation of Within week Absence Equation and Weekly 
Participation (* significant 5% or better, † significant 10%) 
 
 Variable  Coefficient  (SE) 
Const -4.2205*    (0.1379) 
Lag Absence 5.7589*     (0.2031) 
Lag Bakshish -0.0278*     (0.0136) 
   
   
  A
bs
en
ce
 
End of week (Eow) dummies Yes 
Const ( 1θ ) -0.1318     (0.0878) 
Week( 2θ ) -0.2395*   (0.0259) 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
Arab ( 3θ ) 0.0721      (0.0457) 
 LnL -313.5219   
 
The implied elasticity that follows from our estimates can be computed as 
follows. Since we do not observe variation on the daily hours (h) margin for workers 
(they either attend for the day or don’t), we use our estimated probability of absence 
(P) to compute expected hours ( ) (1 )E h h P π= −  where π  is the probability of 
participation. Since there is no variation in daily hours ( ) (1 )E h h Pπ∂ = ∂ − . We 
consider the derivative of this with respect to daily earnings x where from equation (2) 
we see that 1k
x
∂ =∂ . Evaluating quantities at their mean values for  specification I in 
table 6 above gives 
 
[ ]
,
( ) ( (1 )) ( (1 ))
(1 ) assuming 0.3
298( 0.0278)(0.0292)(0.9708)(0.3) ( 8.0559) 0.0107
8
h x
E h x h P x P k x
x x k xh h
P x P P x
k
π πη
π β π π
∂ ∂ − ∂ − ∂= = =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = − −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦
= − − + =
            (15) 
 
As can be seen, noting that the form of the probability function P is Logistic 
and β is the estimated coefficient on lag bakshish in the estimation in table 6the value 
of the elasticity is 0.0107. 
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It implies that an increase in the value of finds of, say, 25% would result in an 
increase in hours supplied of  0.275%. So at the moment on an 8 day (assuming 10 
hours work per day)  period for our 823 workers with and absence rate of 2.9%, there 
would be in aggregate 63931 hours worked per week, if the value of finds were 25% 
higher, then we would on the basis of these estimates expect between an extra 176 
hours of work to be supplied per week. 
 
VIII  Conclusions. 
 
We have used a unique dataset which has by chance survived from 1938 to 
analyse the labour supply of archaeological workers on a dig in northern Syria in that 
year. By piecing together knowledge on the way in which these workers were paid, 
we are able to present results that we argue are consistent with the theory of 
intertemporal labour supply. That is, if workers receive unanticipated and transitory 
shocks to their daily wage rate they will increase their labour supply in response, or 
alternatively be less likely to be absent, on the following day. Our suggestion is that 
we have been able to identify this effect because of the availability of data on daily 
bakshish payments to these archaeological workers which constitute exogenous, 
unanticipated shocks to income which are independent of any of the supply or 
demand influences which have beset other researchers attempts to identify this effect.  
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Appendix I 
 
                 Fixed effects Model for Daily Probability of Absence.  
                  Standard Errors in Brackets (N = 79, NT = 952) * Sig at 5% 
 
Variable Coefficient (SE) 
Lag Absence   2.3491*   (0.2204) 
Lag Bakshish -0.0633*  (0.0247) 
Week Dummies Yes 
End of Week Dummies Yes 
LnL  -235.8642 
 
These estimations still show clearly that we have a negatively significant coefficient 
on the lag of Bakshish payments, after accounting for individual fixed effects 
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